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Thoughts on the Nature and 
Consequences of Ungoverned Spaces
Andrew J. Taylor
Since the 1990s, ungoverned spaces have increasingly been seen as a source of serious 
instability and threat in the international system. Society regards ungoverned spaces as 
the absence of a state as the authoritative allocator of value, provider of collective goods, 
and holder of a monopoly of legitimate coercion. The obvious remedy, then, is state 
building. This apparently simple formulation obscures the complexity and variability 
of ungoverned spaces and the reason for their emergence. Moreover, this ignores the fact 
that ungoverned spaces may lack government but not governance. Ungoverned spaces 
can pose a security threat, but terrorist groups are rarely responsible for their creation; 
the reason for their emergence is poor governance that prompts the populations in these 
areas to render themselves ungovernable by the existing central state.
Introduction
Land and territory are so closely associated with the notion of the state they are seldom analyzed separately. This is surprising given that the planet, 
apart from a few areas such as the Arctic, overwhelmingly divides into sovereign 
national territories,1 and that the state remains the world’s preeminent political 
association. This ubiquity and 
visibility helps explain why the 
concept of ungoverned territory 
seems so worrisome. This paper 
seeks to frame the concept of un-
governed spaces at an overarch-
ing level through three parts: the 
first considers its definition; the 
second explores the relationship between sovereignty, territoriality, and state-
hood; and the third importantly asks: do ungoverned territories pose a serious 
security threat? This paper’s central contention is that ungoverned spaces can 
pose a significant security threat but that terrorist groups (for example) are 
seldom, if ever, responsible for the creation of these spaces. At the heart of 
the problem lies poor governance that leads the populations of these spaces to 
render themselves ungovernable by the existing central state.
Ungoverned spaces can pose a significant 
security threat but terrorist groups (for 
example) are seldom, if ever, responsible 
for the creation of these spaces.
Andrew J. Taylor is personal chair at the Department of Politics, University of Sheffield and 
author of State Failure (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). His research focuses on the concept 
of state failure and the political reconstruction of post-conflict states. Dr. Taylor currently 
specializes in Southeastern Europe and the role of the European Union in state building.
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Definition
Studies of ungoverned territory have been—and remain—strongly influenced 
by the state failure literature that emerged in the 1990s.2 The RAND Corpora-
tion’s definition, for example, derives from—and constitutes a part of—this dis-
course: “Ungoverned territories can be failed or failing states; poorly controlled 
land or maritime borders or airspace; or areas within otherwise viable states 
where the central government’s authority does not extend.”3 In this context, the 
concept of the ungoverned space is inherent in doctrines in counterinsurgency; 
counterterrorism; counternarcotics; stabilization and reconstruction; and peace 
building.4 In turn, political scientists tend to invariably equate ungoverned 
areas with “security threat” and all that it implies. A more inclusive definition 
of ungoverned territory by the US Department of Defense—albeit one still in-
fluenced strongly by the state failure thesis—holds that an ungoverned space is,
A place where the state or central government is unable or unwilling to extend 
control, effectively govern, or influence the local population, and where a pro-
vincial, local, tribal, or autonomous government does not fully or effectively 
govern, due to inadequate governance capacity, insufficient political will, gaps 
in legitimacy, the presence of conflict, or restrictive norms of behavior. “Un-
governed areas” should be assumed to include under-governed, ill-governed, 
contested, and exploitable areas.5
From local to global, the concept of politics finds grounding in a territorial 
imperative, which holds that historically territorially grounded organizations—
particularly the state—define rights over a territory. Territoriality is inherent in 
state sovereignty over a geographical domain. Thus, at its simplest construct, 
state sovereignty equates to control of territory. Both RAND’s definition and 
the one cited above testify eloquently that the discussion of ungoverned areas 
frequently raises more questions than it answers. For example: who determines 
ownership? How is control defined and measured? What attributes render 
ownership viable? Is ownership ever unambiguous?
In a real sense, “ungoverned” is a misnomer. Political scientist Marina 
Ottaway describes state (re)construction as a transition from de jure to de facto 
statehood.6 In a world where a state (or states) claims just about every piece of 
land, we remain concerned with the consequences created by a territory’s lack-
ing a single and sovereign central government. Here, then, ungoverned areas are 
“a concept not about threats that emerge from the absence of governance, but 
about certain potential threats that emerge from the way a place is governed.”7 
Political philosopher David Miller, for example, posits a triangular relationship 
between a land, its residents, and a set of political institutions, whose usual 
configuration is the national sovereign state but which can generate configura-
tions of land, people, and institutions different from the consolidated national-
territorial sovereign state.8 Importantly for Miller, therefore, a territorial entity 
need not wield jurisdictional authority (in the sense of being recognized by 
other similar entities and its people as the legitimate authority) but still pos-
sess many of the appurtenances of statehood; it is also, moreover, a matter of 
debate whether jurisdictional authority lies with the state (state sovereignty) 
or the people (popular sovereignty).
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However, the dominant perception and claim among political scientists 
remains that the state is indispensible, and that its absence conjures images of 
a Hobbesian anarchy.9 “Ungoverned” brings with its train powerful overtones 
of threat, instability, and insecurity, as well as the sense that an ungoverned 
space is something the affected territory and international state system should 
avoid at virtually any cost. Yet, the absence of government does not necessarily 
imply the absence of 
governance. Contested 
and disputed territories 
will have governance. 
Admittedly, this gover-
nance may not be very 
attractive. In fact, since 
the mid-1990s, the in-
ternational community 
has identified “hybrid 
political orders,” “state-like entities,” “proto-states,” and “actually existing gov-
ernance” as breeding grounds for security threats.10 For example, in multiple 
national security strategy documents and speeches US President Bill Clinton 
noted the trend that grave, even existential, threats could and were emerg-
ing from ungoverned and poorly governed states. This diagnosis, although 
originally rejected by his successor, became a driver of United States and global 
foreign policy trends post-September 11, 2001.11 Therefore, many perceive so-
called ungoverned spaces as a significant global “other” about which something 
must be done.
Sovereignty, Territoriality, and Statehood
Max Weber argued a state’s definition must consist of its unique features as a 
political association, namely its relationship with coercion and territory. Specifi-
cally, Weber defined the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”12 In 
contrast, Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of 
States (1933) defines the state “as a person in international law [possessing] 
... (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and 
(d) capacity to enter into relations with other States.” These two definitions 
immediately raise questions of territoriality, particularly what happens when 
a state’s monopoly of legitimate force does not run throughout its territory. 
Weber’s state is the sole claimant of legitimate authority in a territory, delin-
eated from other states by mutually recognized borders. For Weber, therefore, an 
association claiming statehood must demonstrate—and not simply claim—that 
it maintains its borders and controls its territory. Loss of control over terri-
tory can result in secession or the formation of quasi-independent fiefdoms 
or statelets (entities with some of the attributes of a state, notably territorial 
control, created by the dissolution of a larger state) by those hostile to central 
government.13 Recognized borders define states, but the degree of territorial 
“Ungoverned” brings with its train powerful 
overtones of threat, instability, and insecurity, 
as well as the sense that an ungoverned space is 
something the affected territory and internation-
al state system should avoid at virtually any cost. 
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control typically associated with the state is of relatively recent historical origin; 
“fuzzy” boundaries are the basis of ungoverned spaces.14 “Fuzzy” territoriality 
and an inability to control territory 
draws us back to why ungoverned space 
is defined as a security threat.
The threat unattached territory 
poses to international stability has long 
been recognized in international law. 
Throughout history, the principle uti 
possidetis juris (as you possess under 
law), which means that prior internal 
administrative boundaries become 
international boundaries, has gener-
ally applied in international relations 
and international law, in part for the 
laudable aim of avoiding territory-
motivated conflict. However, in practice many situations have arisen where 
established boundaries have little or no linguistic and ethnic relevance. Thus 
the right of self-determination creates potential for conflict based on territori-
ally geographically concentrated disaffected minorities.15 Robert Jackson, for 
example, has suggested that frozen borders are a major cause of conflict:
Those inherited borders became sacrosanct and border changes correspond-
ingly difficult. The right to territorial conquest was extinguished along with the 
right of colonization. The practice of territorial partition was almost universally 
regarded with misgivings…. Threats or acts of secession or irredentism were 
similarly treated with suspicion and were universally opposed.16
The changes outlined above meant that many of the states produced by the dis-
solution of formal empires retained jurisdictional and geographical existence in 
the absence of a dominant central government—and therefore the presence of 
ungoverned spaces. This tendency reflects an uneasy coexistence between com-
peting types of sovereignty, a particular territorial area, namely international-
legal sovereignty and the absence (or weakness) of domestic sovereignty.17
The globe formally divides into “peer polities,” namely states that interact 
with one another according to shared principles and norms relating to domestic 
and international sovereignty, which focus on the inviolability of borders and 
freedom from external interference in a state’s domestic affairs, and whose 
interactions are not determined by a single, dominant actor. However, despite 
formal equality across these polities, not all states within themselves are equal 
in either power or effectiveness.18 This brings us to the question of statehood.
Central to thinking about the relationship between the state, territory, 
and control is that a state must deliver a minimal level of functions and col-
lective goods, notably maintaining order and an effective government capable 
of retaining a claim to rule the contiguous territory. This is statehood, or con-
solidated statehood. It rests on the exercise of internal and external sovereignty; 
the possession of legitimacy and authority; a monopoly of armed force; and, 
more debatably, on institutional and normative restraints on the exercise of 
government power.19 The core assumption is that an ability to make, implement, 
In practice many situations have 
arisen where established boundar-
ies have little or no linguistic and 
ethnic relevance. Thus the right of 
self-determination creates poten-
tial for conflict based on territori-
ally geographically concentrated 
disaffected minorities.
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and enforce authoritative decisions throughout a territory is fundamental, and 
the remedy for any political association failing to do so is state building. His-
torically and globally, consolidated statehood is of relatively recent emergence. 
Historically, limited statehood has been more common. Inherent in limited 
statehood is the feature of ungoverned spaces, where the government’s writ 
does not extend.
This implies a causal chain underpinning a claim to statehood. First, 
the right to make rules flows from effective control of territory. Who holds 
the right to govern a territory is frequently the outcome of violent political 
competition. Second, the linking of a state’s right to govern a territory free 
from external intervention leads to a status quo bias, which means that when a 
state has demonstrated control, it is legitimate for the state to resist challenges 
and for it to call other states to support it in its efforts. These are, of course, 
key features of the Charter of the 
United Nations. It is irrelevant that 
alternative groups within a territory 
challenging the state might be better 
at governing that territory and its 
people. Thus, challenges to territorial 
control should be resisted and only if 
the state is utterly incompetent (i.e., 
failed or collapsed) do other consid-
erations, such as how to respond, be-
come operative. However, determin-
ing when a state is incompetent, failed, or collapsed is difficult to determine, as 
has been demonstrated with respect to the supposed “Responsibility to Protect,” 
whose overall effect seems to have been to reinforce, not reduce, national state 
sovereignty.20 This leads to two conclusions: (1) if a state is not effective, and 
this is liable to lead to areas of a set territory coming under the control of non-
state actors, the state’s territorial right comes into question; and (2) any group 
able to impose order or demonstrate effectiveness could gain territorial right 
in a given area, which raises the possibility of a “might is right” argument that 
is contrary to international law.21
Addressing the problem of ungoverned space is neither easy nor straight-
forward. Conflicts such those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen 
invariably were characterized by, facilitated, or were even caused by external 
intervention and have served to emphasise the scale of the challenge posed by 
ungoverned spaces. Rebuilding central state capacity is seldom an adequate 
answer, as central government (and its actions) is usually a major reason why 
these areas became ungovernable and external intervention or involvement is 
likely to provoke a powerful counter response from within the affected state. 
Western states and their public opinions (who whilst demanding security 
have become increasingly sceptical about state building) have shown that they 
neither have the resources or political will to sustain long-term state building, 
and that their actions tend to exacerbate already adverse conditions. Moreover, 
existing unofficial forms of government in these spaces may be in better posi-
tions to achieve order and more effective at addressing the local population’s 
needs than the “official” government.
The core assumption is that an abil-
ity to make, implement, and enforce 
authoritative decisions throughout 
a territory is fundamental, and the 
remedy for any political association 
failing to do so is state building.
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Sheer political complexity nullifies simple solutions that exclude the exist-
ing state. The US Department of Defense report on ungoverned areas noted, 
“For diplomatic, legal, and practical reasons, the local state cannot be ignored 
or bypassed, but nor should it be permitted to impede progress against safe 
havens when other entities are positioned to help.”22 Thus, “Legitimacy with-
out capacity is unproductive. Capacity without legitimacy is counterproduc-
tive... with respect to illicit actors: Efforts to reduce their capacity to operate 
are more effective when bolstered by efforts to reduce their legitimacy in the 
eyes of key populations.”23 Moreover, the concept “ungoverned” is relative, 
rather than absolute. To further complicate the matter, there are degrees of 
“ungoverned-ness,” including: exploitable areas, contested areas, misgoverned 
areas, under-governed areas and—the most extreme case—ungoverned areas. 
The ungoverned areas report captured the problem:
A weak, failed, or collapsed state performs none of its governance functions ef-
fectively in a given area, freeing illicit actors to pursue threatening activities... 
All ungoverned areas have the potential to become comprehensive safe havens, 
but not all them do; those ungoverned areas that do become safe havens, many 
are exploited not by transnational illicit actors but by groups whose activities 
and interests remain strictly local.24
The diagnosis above points directly to the potential security issues raised by 
ungoverned spaces and prompts the question: do ungoverned areas constitute 
an external security threat?
Ungoverned Areas: So What?
Many governments perceive ungoverned territories as a security threat be-
cause the borders of weak or failing states can produce spillover effects, with 
turmoil spreading like an ink-blot. As state capacities are challenged, with-
drawn, or ejected, porosity created by these conditions tends to promulgate 
further turmoil and ungovernability. 
This occurred in West Africa during the 
1990s when the Liberian conflict me-
tastasised, undermining Côte d’Ivoire, 
Guinea, and Sierra Leone. “Bad neigh-
borhoods,” areas characterized by an 
absence of order and stability, can 
encourage failure in vulnerable states. 
More specifically, shared borders can 
transmit unrest from a singular ungov-
erned space to neighboring states whereby affiliations that challenge the state 
create transborder territorial networks based on ethnicity, political affinity, or 
economic self-interest. In some cases, the resulting multinational networks 
resemble proto-states.
Ungoverned spaces pose different degrees of threat. Those that harbour 
terrorism associated with global jihadism; provide bases for non-jihadi terror-
As state capacities are challenged, 
withdrawn, or ejected, porosity 
created by these conditions tends 
to promulgate further turmoil and 
ungovernability.
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ism and criminal networks; and which are areas of humanitarian crisis prove 
to be the most threatening. It is also the case that a humanitarian crisis could 
precipitate a process that moves beyond a population criticizing the inef-
fectiveness of the present state to one that seeks to supplant the present state 
leadership. The 2007 RAND study “Ungoverned Territories” contains case stud-
ies of eight regions with seeming potential to become terrorist sanctions: the 
Pakistan-Afghanistan Border, the Arabian Peninsula, the Sulawesi-Mindanao 
Arc, the East African Corridor, West Africa, the North Caucasus, the Colombia-
Venezuela Border, and the Guatemala-Chiapas Border. In the report, RAND 
explores ungoverned territories through two dimensions: ungovernability and 
conduciveness to terrorism.
The piece measures governability using four indicators: the level of state 
penetration into society, the extent to which the state retains a monopoly of 
force, the extent to which the state can control its borders, and whether the 
area is vulnerable to external intervention. It measures ungovernability by 
the malfunctioning or non-functioning of state institutions, which indicates: 
potential vacuums for other forces to fill, the degree of local compliance with 
national law, the degree of collaboration with the state by potentially disaf-
fected groups, and the extent of local acceptance of state legitimacy. Common 
to all these dimensions is authority. Social and cultural resistance to the central 
state—a preference for institutions that accord with local conditions—and the 
organization of alternative instruments of coercion indicate a rejection of state 
authority and the possibility of a “shadow state,” possibly with the support and 
encouragement of outside actors.25 None of this means an ungoverned territory 
will become a security threat. Whether or not a territory becomes a security 
threat depends on its attractiveness and viability as a base for terrorist groups.
In addition, RAND’s “Ungoverned Territories” identifies four variables 
that influence whether an area is “conducive” to terrorist exploitation. They 
are: adequacy of infrastructure and operational access (for instance: com-
munications, official or unofficial banking, or transport); sources of income 
(from, for instance: drugs, human trafficking, diamonds, or piracy), favorable 
demographic and social characteristics (success depends on some popular sup-
port or acquiescence often reinforced by a history of conflict with the center); 
and invisibility (pertaining to being physically inhospitable and geographically 
remote). These areas may display complex governance, as when the criminal 
networks and terrorist or insurgent networks render them indistinguishable and 
the former provide support and revenue in return for security and protection. 
The development of non-state governance shows why ungoverned territories 
can be used to explore processes of state formation, which can be captured by 
the shift from Mancur Olson’s “mobile” to “stationary” bandits.26 Terrorists and 
insurgents can be defeated only if found. The difficulties of so doing are ampli-
fied if these individuals are capable of “disappearing” into ungoverned (often 
trans-border) regions.27 This leaves open the question of whether terrorist and 
insurgent groups are a cause or a symptom of ungoverned spaces.
The “Ungoverned Territories” case studies support a typology of out-
comes, each of which implies different responses. First, “contested governance” 
is where a group rejects the legitimacy of a government’s rule and pledges 
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loyalty to another political association, such as an insurgent movement or 
clan. Second is “incomplete governance,” where a state aspires to assert its au-
thority, but lacks the resources to produce necessary collective goods. Third is 
“abdicated governance,” which is where central government abdicates its role as 
provider of collective goods, deeming that attempting to maintain an effective 
presence is neither cost-effective nor politically desirable.28 The dividing lines 
between these are indistinct, but nevertheless the categories are reasonable and 
implicate the difficulty of formulating an effective response to weaknesses of 
territoriality. The obvious response is state building, but that response raises 
as many questions as it answers.
Ungoverned territories score high on the presence of local armed groups 
and having a relative absence of state institutions; they show a lack of border 
control, a key factor in explaining their existence and nature. This is hardly 
unexpected. Supportive social norms are particularly important in stimulating 
and sustaining the resilience of 
alternative political structures 
in areas of contested gover-
nance. The analysis of ungov-
erned spaces often attempts 
to distinguish between cases 
where ungovernability derives 
less from local resistance than 
from central state neglect or 
incompetence, with the latter 
being easier to address than the 
former. However, the two tend 
to go hand in hand. Ungoverned territories can be governed by a “shadow-state” 
that displays the appurtenances of a state except juridical sovereignty. Thus, ten-
sion between de facto and de jure sovereignty poses a major conundrum when 
developing responses to ungoverned spaces. Should external actors support the 
legal but ineffective central quasi-state or the effective but illegal quasi-state?
Ungoverned spaces—perceived as anarchic zones outside formal state 
control that constituted a security threat—was a well-established narrative 
by 2000, but received an additional infusion of focus with the occurrence of 
September 11, 2001. The “9/11 Commission Report” reflected this, noting that:
To find sanctuary, terrorist organizations have fled to some of the least governed, 
most lawless places in the world... areas that combine rugged terrain, weak gov-
ernment, room to hide or receive supplies, and low population density with a 
town or city near enough to allow necessary interaction with the outside world.29
In response to this emerging consensus, scholar Stewart M. Patrick made three 
key observations about the security implications of ungoverned spaces. First, 
a focus on geographical remoteness ignores the significance of large, teeming 
cities with poor governance for anonymity, as well as the necessity of infrastruc-
tural access for terrorist recruitment, organization, propaganda, and funding. 
Second, truly anarchic environments pose serious obstacles to terrorist groups, 
and these significantly increased the costs of operating in these environments. 
The analysis of ungoverned spaces often 
attempts to distinguish between cases 
where ungovernability derives less from 
local resistance than from central state 
neglect or incompetence, with the latter 
being easier to address than the former. 
However, the two tend to go hand in hand.
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Third, ungoverned spaces are not voids that terrorists could simply fill; they are 
political spaces that require such groups engage with to win the support—or 
at least acquiescence—of local power-holders. Certainly, terrorists can take 
advantage of alternative political orders, creating local and tactical alliances to 
secure these locations, but “fixing” these groups territorially necessarily opens 
them to easier attack and they become vulnerable to shifting loyalties and al-
liances.30 It cannot be denied that poorly governed or ungoverned spaces can, 
and do, host terrorist threats. However, these threats alone are not the creating 
source of spaces lacking governance. Rather, governance issues are the result 
of specific historical, cultural, and geopolitical factors and these spaces exist 
“because the inhabitants make themselves ungovernable from the capital.”31 
The most pertinent question for analysts, therefore, is not the degree or quality 
of governance, but more aptly “the manner of governance: Who is, and who is 
not, governing an area, and what are the consequences of the particular way they 
govern?”32 Not all ungoverned areas constitute a security threat. When they do, 
those most directly affected are those who live there, something that govern-
ments often forget.
Conclusions
Linkage between territorial integrity and sovereignty—both internal and ex-
ternal—becomes significant because of the problems posed by political and 
territorial fragmentation in a world of states. Territories are complex, and a 
major component of statecraft is about containing the inevitable centrifugal 
tendencies of statehood. Ungoverned space is, at least in part, space where 
centrifugal are greater than centripetal forces. Maintaining cohesion too often 
degenerates into coercion, thereby accelerating fragmentation and frequently 
ultimately to dissolution of existing governance. This tendency of ungoverned 
spaces is characteristic of a significant subset of national states. It cannot be 
ignored.
However, state death is a rarity.33 Indeed, we have been living through a 
major period of state creation. Whatever the scale of their internal problems, 
states as bounded territories are seldom absorbed by their neighbors. They 
are far more likely to split and form new 
states. However, most usually the states 
continue in existence. This is the prod-
uct of Westphalian sovereignty and the 
peremptory norms of international law, 
developments powerfully reinforced by 
decolonization and the UN system. Yet 
states within this system are not equally 
powerful or effective, leading to the emer-
gence of quasi-states, several of which have 
been characterized as failed states, from which spring the threat of ungoverned 
spaces. States displaying the trappings of external sovereignty, but whose in-
ternal sovereignty has fragmented, are perceived as a threat to international 
States displaying the trappings 
of external sovereignty, but 
whose internal sovereignty has 
fragmented, are perceived as a 
threat to international order.
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order. Events in the 1990s such as the break-up of Yugoslavia, the collapse in 
Somalia, and the Rwandan genocide, led to attempts to render sovereignty 
more conditional; broadened responses such that humanitarian intervention 
morphed into state building; and new doctrines to deal with the problems and 
consequences, real and perceived, of the ungoverned space. The legal efforts of 
the Badinter Committee with respect to Yugoslavia aimed to avoid the creation 
of ungoverned space.34
The purpose of sovereign power is the management of centrifugal tenden-
cies; all polities have internal divisions, but these do not always lead to ungov-
erned space. What characterizes the failed state is territorial fragmentation to a 
degree that impairs its ability to act domestically and internationally. The failed 
state and ungoverned space forms a subset of states—jurisdictionally sovereign 
but internally fragmented—that constitute a perceived threat to international 
order that poses serious problems for those addressing ungoverned spaces.
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